T HE general purpose of the Gesta was to relate what had happened since Henry V's accession in such a way as to reflect favourably upon the king's character and policy. Henry himself is represented as an essentially devout Christian prince, and his " political " aims as being all of a piece with this. So far as the king's domestic policy is concerned, the author lays great emphasis on the soundness of his churchmanship, particularly with regard to Lollardy. So far as his external policy is concerned, the theme is predominantly that of the justice of Henry's hereditary claim to the French crown which God Himself has adjudged to be his, and of Henry's pursuit, as God's humble instrument, of a just peace on the basis of that divine judgement, by diplomatic means and, when made necessary by the arrogance and " duplicity " of the French, by military force. To divine support had been added, our author claims, not only the approval and active assistance of the English nobility and people, but also the alliance of the emperor, Sigismund, of whose zeal for the Universal Church and the welfare of all Christendom, not least that of the French, he himself had offered tangible proof. If only, the Gesta argues, the French would see reason and accept God's arbitrament, all would be well with the two great Christian kingdoms of the West, and, following this, they could turn against the heathen, meaning the Turkish menace in the East, Sigismund having long been personally involved in resisting that menace. Such propaganda, mainly in aid of the English cause, but with more general implications, loses nothing in persuasiveness by being cast in the form of a narrative of events.
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But, although the general purpose of the Gesta may be clear, one cannot feel so assured about the kind of '* audience " for which the work was intended. The imperfections it contains, minor though these may be, make it, for example, most unlikely that it was intended for presentation to any person of distinction. It has survived in two manuscripts,1 one (the Sloane) copied from the other (the Julius). The latter is itself a copy taken from an exemplar (whether the lost original or another transcript of it) which contained gaps gaps which presumably occurred in the author's holograph. Thus, spaces are left for certain Christian names2 which the author might have been expected to know, and the titles of certain psalms3 known to other authors writing about the London pageant are here omitted, although our author undoubtedly witnessed the pageant. There are other deficiencies ; for example, the account of Henry V's monastic foundations4 is in the form of a drastic abbreviation of a longer description. If not, however, written for any particular person, the work was obviously designed to serve a definite purpose. Moreover, it was known quite soon after it was composed, as is shown by the fact that within roughly a year of its composition considerable use of it was made by Elmham in his Liber Metricus.
The Latin in which the Gesta was composed is, one might well argue, of such a kind as to have been most readily intelligible to the trained cleric. The work is written with subtlety, imagination, and, despite frequently lengthy sentences and an occasional " breathlessness " in style, with care and precision. It also contains certain features suggesting that its author could have had in mind predominantly a clerical audience. Amongst these may be mentioned not merely the many citations from Holy Scripture but also the biblical undertones which occur throughout, the emphasis on the king's piety and devotion, and the interest exhibited in the liturgical arrangements of the royal chapel, not to mention the constant moralizing and the pursuit of a didactic or exhortatory purpose. On the other hand, as regards most of its content, and notably the military and diplomatic narratives, the story is such as to have been also capable of attracting the attention of lay contemporaries, not least ,those mentioned in it by name and others who knew them well. No doubt, like all effective propaganda, the Gesta was designed to mean different things to different men, and to satisfy a variety of " political " and other requirements. A clue to the author's immediate purpose is afforded by the very fact that a work of this nature should have been composed between November 1416 and the second invasion of Normandy in July 1417.1 That immediate purpose was clearly to justify the necessity for the king's recourse to war a second time in the quarrel with Charles VI and to encourage the support that would be needed. A decision to continue the war had in fact been taken in the autumn parliament of 1416.2 There Beaufort, the chancellor, had upheld such a policy on the ground that the aim of war is to secure peace. 3 Before the dissolution of that parliament on 18 November, in answer to his demand for help in fulfilling the king's " just purpose " in face of French obstinacy, a grant had been made of two tenths and fifteenths, three quarters of which were due in barely six weeks* time (at Candlemas), the remainder at Martinmas.4 This was lavish, especially coming on top of the previously heavy exactions of the reign, a fact of which parliament was not unaware : indeed, when making its grant it stipulated that no fresh subsidy should even be asked for before the present grant had been collected, and, moreover, that there should be no repetition of the recent practice of advancing the time of collection originally agreed. The convocation of Canterbury (which, sitting from 9 to 23 November, overlapped the parliament) also met for the same basic reason. For, as soon as it got down to business (not before 1 8 November, the day of parliament's dissolution), not only did the king send Beaufort, along with the Earl Marshal, the prior of St. John, and Henry Ware, the keeper of the Privy Seal, to commend to the prayers of the assembly his own and the kingdom's *' estate and prosperity " (which the chancellor proceeded to do " cum 1 See BULLETIN, liii. 428-29.
2 Williams, p. 106. verbis graciosis ... civiliter prolatis ") but, when the two peers left, Beaufort and Ware remained behind with their fellowecclesiastics.1 Whether or not they needed to exert further pressure, five days later (on 23 November, the day of convocation's dismissal) the clergy granted! two tenths.2 This, again, was generous, especially as an early collection was also agreed (three-quarters leviable at Candlemas, the remainder the following April). All the same, it was stipulated that the clerical tenth granted the previous year (November 1415) and now due a year hence (November 1417) should be postponed until June 1418.3 The response of both clergy and laity had been liberal, but the conditions they attached to their grants suggest that these had not been secured effortlessly. Neither parliament nor convocation, however warm in their general support, can have been other than anxious at the frequent calls on them and the increased pressure of taxation.
The malaise felt in parliament and convocation may well have reflected a failure to sustain enthusiasm in the country at large, no doubt aggravated by recent increases in taxation for military purposes. That the government was aware of this in the Spring of 1417 and reacted accordingly, may be inferred from the mandate issued on 8 May by Archbishop Chichele,4 prompted by the king, urging upon clergy and laity the necessity for greater participation in processions, litanies and prayers in aid of the prosperity of king and country and of victory against their adversaries ; for, it is stated, in spite of earlier exhortations both clergy and laity had been growing " tepid " in such devotions. The Gesta could well have been intended to serve much the same purpose amongst its readers. For its author emphasizes this very point, instancing the assistance derived from the processions and prayers for victory offered by the English Church at the time of both Agincourt and the battle of the Seine, and stressing what the king, despite all set-backs, had achieved with God's help.5 Indeed, more than once the writer of the Gesta turns aside to apostrophize his countrymen, urging them to greater devotion to the Divine Author of all the manifold benefactions the king had received; " And let our England be zealous in pleasing God unceasingly, in purging herself of heresies and errors, along with other acts of sedition and unrighteousness, in making acknowledgment, more fully and perfectly than before, in hymns, by confession, and with chants, and in singing psalms to the Lord Who hath done marvellous things in Israel and given the victory to His anointed. And let her pour forth prayers, supplications and tears. . . . "l And again, in another passage : " But, 0 you his people, how deserving of displeasure if you heed not more zealously than is your wont, his [the king's] example in praising and honouring the Most High. . . . "2 While seeking to reassure his readers by citing instances of God's beneficence, including those most recent, the Gesta implores England to be humble and grateful and, in order to merit the continuance of divine favour, to strive to serve God more fervently than before. Whether or not it was designed to help allay anxieties about a second campaign, its exhortations indicate that it was meant to be read, and used as propaganda, in England, possibly to offset that " tepidity" of devotion referred to in the archbishop's encyclical of 8 May 1417. There are, however, considerations which suggest that to regard the Gesta as having been written solely for home consumption might be to take too narrow a view of its purpose. Justification of Henry's policy, and especially his policy towards France, was needed not only in England. There was another sphere in which, precisely at this very time, it was also needed the Council of Constance. 3 In fact, as far as English propaganda there was concerned, nothing was more important than to justify Henry's policy during these particular months. For the winter of 1416-17 was a time when the English delegation at Constance, even allowing for its recent reinforcement,4 needed all the moral support it could get. The war between England and France had embittered relations between the English and French " nations " in the Council, and English military successes and diplomacy had only further exacerbated what had now developed into an implacable feud, liable to threaten even armed violence between the retinues of the delegates. The hostile attitude of the French was undisguised; in Valois' words, " C'est une veritable guerre que le gouvernement francais declara aux Anglais de Constance ". 1 And once the representatives of Alphonso V of Aragon had arrived, ready on certain conditions to adhere to the Council and to assist in the proceedings for the deposition of Benedict XIII,2 the French were provided with a convenient opportunity to harass and vex the English delegates over a matter fundamentally important to the latter. For the arrival of the Aragonese in September 1416 raised the question of the basis on which the Spaniards should be incorporated as a " nation "; and Cardinal D'Ailly, Charles VI's representative and the leader of the French, although not responsible for the Aragonese claim to precedence over the English, supported it and immediately questioned whether the English should even continue to be recognized as a separate " nation ". The English delegation fiercely resisted that attempt to degrade its status, and the quarrel was revived more than once between November 1416 and March 1417, finally erupting on 3 March in the violent challenge to the English position made by Charles VI's proctor, Jean de Campagne. Relying on Benedict XII's bull Vas Electionis (historically intended, as the English were able to point out, to provide for the organization of provincial chapters among the Benedictines), he insisted that England was not one of the " nationes principales " or " amplissime nationes " (nations in the fullest sense) but only one of the " nationes particulares ", not all of which were kingdoms, and that her standing in the Council as a separate " nation " was a " difformitas, tanquam iniqua absurditas in Dei Ecclesia ". Perhaps, he argued, every such kingdom as England ought to be separately represented in the Council, but, if the principal nations would not condescend to so inconvenient a " subdistinctio et multiplicatio", he proposed a return to the traditional conciliar procedure which had not provided for any " distinctio nationum " ; the English in securing status as a conciliar nation had in effect usurped a " novum ms ", no other kingdom having arrogated to itself such a title.1 The Council, however, wanting to deal more expeditiously with the process of Benedict's deposition, was growing weary of the dispute and its divisive effects. And when, on 31 March, Henry V's ambassador and proctor, Thomas Polton, made his protest against this attack on the rights of both his master and the " mdubitata natio inclyta Anglicana alias Brittanica ", dealing with the French arguments in detail but condemning them as generally " frivole et inepte ", the assembly excused him from reading the protest on the ground of its prolixity.2 Only then might the French challenge to the continued existence of the English as a distinct " nation " be said to have failed, and the latter to have felt secure as one of the (now) five conciliar nations. The author of the Gesta may have felt that, during this long and arduous dispute, a justification of Henry's character and policy, expressed in the story of his military success and diplomatic endeavours to make peace, might serve to combat French efforts to influence conciliar opinion against the king and the English delegates. The channels of communication between England and the Council were, of course, constantly open, through movements of ecclesiastical personnel and by means of diplomatic commissions, and opportunity for contact was readily possible. 3
In this connection, too, there are certain individual points in the Gesta worth noticing points, one would have thought, not particularly required in a justification written solely for home consumption but more relevant in the broader context of Constance. For example, the reminder of the friendship entered into by Henry V with Ferdinand of Aragon, the father and predecessor of Alphonso V,1 or the reference to the presence at the siege of Harfleur of the bishop of Bangor.2 This latter gave the he to De Campagne's assertion in the Council on 7 March (1417) that Wales, although part of the province of Canterbury (one of the only two provinces, he was careful to say, England possessed), was not subject to the English king, and that the Welsh clergy were not and had no wish to be members of the English nation. De Campagne's argument had also instanced the kingdom of Scotland as " non subditum . . . regi Anglic " and stated that its people were unwilling to be considered part of the English nation. It is therefore not without interest that the Gesta, in its only reference to Scotland, specifically mentions the " homage and other peculiar rights due from of old to the crown of England from the kings of the Scots and their people, demanded on behalf of the king in accordance with lawful documents ",3 This " subjection " Polton was well aware of when, in answer to De Campagne's assertion that the English " nation " at the Council represented no more than one kingdom, he claimed that Scotland was one of a number of kingdoms subordinate to England, doubtless finding support for this theory in the letter of 1301 from Edward I to Boniface VIII justifying English suzerainty over Scotland, a transcript of which Polton added to his own private copy of the acta of the Council (written probably soon after the Council ended).4 Moreover, when, on 31 March, Polton presented his protest, Scotland, France's ally, had only recently, and for the first time, sent a delegation to Constance, having long held out against a withdrawal of obedience from the anti-pope Benedict XIII.
Rodbourne, incidentally, is one whose name has been mentioned in discussing the problem of the authorship of the Gesta (see BULLETIN, liii. 462-63). Surely such traffic was hardly " one-way ". In this broader context of affairs at Constance, two references in the Gesta to Bernard VII, count of Armagnac, may also be noticed. In the first he is mentioned as the leader of the French against Dorset at Valmont, and in the second as the man who organized the blockade of Harfleur1 and so, our author insists, jeopardized the efforts made by Henry and Sigismund in 1416 to reach peace with France. In considering how the Gesta might have assisted the English cause at Constance, it is important to realize that Armagnac was no friend to the Council nor the Council to him. At this time his personal attitude to the problem of Benedict XIII's deposition, which confronted it, was so uncertain as to make him persona non grata there. Having been present during Sigismund's futile discussions with the antipope at Perpignan between September and November 1415, he had been party to the Capitulation of Narbonne in December following,2 although on this occasion he did not himself attend. However, despite the fact that an Aragonese embassy to the French court in February 1416 had been charged to request him to sign the Capitulation and, in his turn, repudiate Benedict XIII,3 as late as March 1417 adherents of his at the Council were said to be still trying to impede the process of Benedict's deposition,4 and even in June following there was evidently doubt as to whether he had finally committed himself to that repudiation, as the other parties to the Capitulation had already done, including the kings of Aragon, Castile and Navarre. 5 All that Gerson, the chancellor of the University of Paris, could say in the Council on Armagnac's behalf was that the French understood that he was resolved to follow the lead of Charles VI,6 an explanation which Sigismund felt did not represent a satisfactory fulfilment by the count of the terms concluded at Narbonne. Because Armagnac was constable of France and, as leader of the anti-Burgundian faction then in power, virtually governor of the country, his position with regard to this important question 1 
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THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY was all the more discreditable and embarrassing to the French at Constance. Given these circumstances, the references to Armagnac in the Gesta as the active opponent of Henry and of the cause of peace may not have been accidental.
In considering the Gesta in relation to Constance, there is another aspect of the work which comes to mind: its author's attitude to Sigismund himself. Here, too, one is struck by the conjunction between the time of writing and the appositeness of the work to events at the Council. A glance at Sigismund's relations with the Council at this time will perhaps make this clear. Following his return to Constance in January 1417, Sigismund had not only alienated the French and aroused sympathy for them among their friends, but by his blatant partiality towards the English had weakened his own moral authority and control in the Council. His actions had been so overbearing as to jeopardize its future unity and effectiveness and even, some alleged, its continuance. When now, in addition, by declaring his intention to join England in her war on France, he not only outraged the French but excited the opposition of even his own (the German) " nation ", so uniting most of the Council against him, his position as " advocate " and protector of the Council, already impaired by his long absence from Constance, became much less secure and commanding. Now the Gesta s justification of Henry is based on the argument that, in claiming the French crown, he was merely asserting his right to what was already his by inheritance and resorting to war after all attempts by peaceable means had failed ; and that those attempts had failed only because of the " duplicitas " of the French and their refusal to accept divine judgements made plain by a succession of English victories before and during his reign. Implicit in this argument is the fact that Henry had also persuaded Sigismund of the justice of his cause, and had done this so convincingly as actually to have converted him into his ally against France, even though it had been to the emperor's interest as the avowed protector of the Council to remain neutral and uncommitted. When Sigismund left Constance in July 1415 one of his motives had been to compose the Anglo-French quarrel in the interests of conciliar unity. When he returned some eighteen months later he had engaged himself by the treaty of Canterbury (August 1416) to give military assistance to the English when they should again invade France. This alliance and his friendship with Henry aggravated, immediately, the Anglo-French conflict in the Council. For Sigismund made no secret of his pride and satisfaction in the English connection and constantly assisted the English delegates in their conciliar disputes with the French, doing so in ways best calculated to antagonize the latter and irritate and provoke their friends. The English, too, were determined to emphasize the alliance and to extract from it all possible advantage.
The manner of the emperor's return to Constance had set the tone of much that was to follow. When he rode into the city on Wednesday, 27 January 1417, he wore the English royal " lyvere of the coler " which, says a correspondent of Henry V, was " a glad syghte to alle your lyge men to se 'V It was also reported that in the course of the public welcome he greeted the English prelates most warmly, touching only their hands in the great press of dignitaries. In turn, Bishop Hallum of Salisbury, the most senior of the English bishops, lost no time in honouring the emperor, and as ostentatiously as possible. Hurriedly leaving the procession in order to anticipate Cardinal D'Ailly, he took possession of the pulpit in the cathedral and preached the formal sermon of welcome in which, taking the text " Ent magnus coram Domino " (Luke J. 15), he lauded Sigismund in effusive terms.2 On the following morning the English ambassadors and members of their " nation " had an audience of him in his palace, and Bishop Catterick, their then president, made a speech. On the Friday there was another reception at which Sigismund, having shaken hands all round and thanked the English for their dealings with his " nation " in his absence, recalled the progress of his alliance with England (begun under Henry IV and now made closer), and commended their king, his brothers, and the government of their church and country ; Catterick again responded.3 The English bishops then invited 234 THE JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY the emperor and many other temporal lords of the German lands, including Lewis of Bavaria (count palatine of the Rhine, Henry V's brother-in-law, and " custos et defensor concilii " during Sigismund's absence from Constance), to a great banquet on the Sunday. Earlier that day at mass Sigismund had worn the robes of the Garter and, again, the royal collar. This collar, so it was reported in a letter written (probably by Robert Appleton) to Bishop Langley of Durham in mid-March, the emperor wore habitually, " quae in Gallorum oculis multum taediosa et nociva consistit 'V Nor was this all outward show. For in February Sigismund openly intervened in the dispute arising out of the demand that the English delegates should cease to act as a distinct " nation " in the Council, not concealing his irritation, especially against the French as the promoters of this dispute2 ; and when, on 3 March, the latter, through De Campagne, renewed the attack, now suggesting inter alia that the English should amalgamate with the German " nation ", the emperor personally spoke of the whole proposal as shameful and also dangerous to the Council, and demanded that such a protest should never be allowed to recur.3 This, Cardinal Fillastre commented, was because ** notorie favebat Anglicis et odio habebat Gallicos ".4
What, however, in March threw the whole Council into a ferment was the revelation that Sigismund's alliance with England was intended to involve him in affording Henry V direct military assistance when next he invaded France; in Fillastre's words, " promiserat esse cum rege Anglic in armis in Francia Parisius et contra regem et regnum Francie. Quae omnia hiis diebus patefacta sunt ". 5 What had begun as a rumour was soon confirmed by Sigismund himself who, despite the long alliance of his family with the Valois, made public his intention to " defy " Charles VI and even drew up " litteras diffidatorias". Not only did, first, the representatives of Aragon and Navarre and, later, the cardinals and the Italians hasten to point out the dangers for the Council's future of such a course of action1 and to persuade Sigismund to desist, but also, as members of a special deputation, so did even the Germans, who were normally obedient to the emperor's wishes. Indeed, the German '* nation ", says Fillastre, although usually actively favouring the English, was much upset and grieved (" turbata et dolens "), its members said many bitter things to the emperor (" multa aspere . . . locuti sunt ") and, of all those present, they were most insistent that he should renounce his intention to " defy" the French king. In the end it was agreed that Sigismund should not send his " letters of diffidation" to Charles just yet; and, although he dispatched them by a herald to Henry V to be used how and when the latter pleased, it was also agreed that the Italian, Spanish and German " nations " (or rather the whole Council, if the French and English consented) should send envoys to persuade Henry to agree to a peace or truce with France, it being understood that Sigismund would not " defy " or attack the French king until after their return.2 By 15 April, however, Sigismund is said by Fillastre to have been openly declaring himself an enemy of Charles VI, and on 10 June it was rumoured that he was preparing to attack him, having been told that the French cardinals and the French ambassadors at the Council were about to publish the sworn agreement which he had formerly made with Charles but was now about to contravene.3 Thus, by the way in which it justifies the Anglo-imperial alliance through an exposure of French diplomatic duplicity, the Gesta implicitly vindicates Sigismund as well as Henry. Its explanation of his alliance with England may well have been intended to pacify the furore aroused at Constance by the impending military consequences of that alliance, and to help to rehabilitate the imperial persona. In this connection it is of particular importance to notice that Henry's alliance with Sigismuncl in 1416 is represented in the Gesta not as a fresh departure but as the confirmation and renewal of an alliance previously contracted,1 so implying that Sigismund had not suddenly and casually abandoned an old friend (France) for an entirely new one (England). It is noteworthy, too, that in his general appreciation of Sigismund, the author of the Gesta makes a special point of commending him for two things which the Council must surely have approved and with which the emperor had been most deeply concerned : his efforts to bring about a just settlement between England and France,2 vitiated by French " duplicity ", and his care for the well-being of the Universal Church as represented at Constance, particularly his desire that the Council should end the papal schism. 3 Allied with this implicit vindication of Sigismund's diplomatic activities is the Gesta s warm approbation of him personally. 4 Our author is at pains to state that the impression left behind in England by Sigismund's visit was totally favourable: he mentions with approval how his retainers on leaving Canterbury unobtrusively let fall " cedule " praising England for her piety,5 the general agreeableness and propriety of conduct of his household, the emperor's own kindliness,6 his generous treatment of Burgundy at Calais where (by Henry's mediation) they were reconciled,7 and his liberality towards those Englishmen temporarily assigned to his service when he was Henry's guest.8 In fact, the work could hardly have failed to have had a special 4 Of course, no special significance should be attached to its forms of reference to Sigismund, as, for example, " supenllustnssimus princeps ", " christianissimus et superillustrissimus princeps ", " supremus princeps " (Williams, pp. 8, 75, 78) . Such expressions can be paralleled in English official documents of the time. For example, " invictissimus et supenllustnssimus in Christo princeps in the commission to the embassy instructed to treat for a league with Sigismund at Constance in 1414 (Rymer, ix. 168); " serenissimus et excellentissimus princeps " in the royal letters of March 1416 alluding to his impending English visit (ibid. p. 331); and "miles victoriosissimus" and "christianissimus princeps" in Archbishop Chichele's general mandate ordering prayers for Sigismund's good estate in, respectively, June 1415 and August 1416 (Jacob, Chichele Register, iii. 436 ; iv. 158). These expressions were common diplomatic usage. 5 Although concerned with English diplomacy during these years, the Gesta is also a record of the military success of Henry V and his commanders. And notably so. Fully half its pages are devoted to military operations on land or sea, and all of these are represented as for the most part successful, the Agincourt campaign even brilliantly. The French, fighting in an unjust cause, are depicted as no match for the English who, fighting in a just one, enjoy the divine support denied their enemies. The English are valiant; the French, certainly at Agincourt, degenerate. The English, Edwardian, tradition of victory in arms was being maintained and, especially under the king's leadership, even splendidly extended. This was a happy augury; and Sigismund, who, our author says,1 gloried in Henry's exploits, might well take heart for the future in which, by the treaty of Canterbury, his own military fortunes were to be (so the English hoped and he imagined) bound up with those of Henry. So, too, might the German nobility, upon whose support Sigismund would be obliged to rely if he were to stand by his undertakings to the English king.
The recurrent theme of the Gesta, that Henry only sought peace with justice, is carried one stage further in the supplication which ends the work.2 For here the writer prays not only that, under God's protection, England and France might cease from their own destruction and be united under Henry's single rule (" monarchia "), but that they might then together turn their swords as soon as possible against " the unsubdued and bloody faces of the heathen ". Our author could hardly have expressed more closely a desire which had long been dear to Sigismund's own heart: that he might reconcile these two countries, end the schism in the Church, and then lead an united Christendom against the Turks. The prayer is no doubt to be read as referring to Henry, whose own wish to take part in such a crusade is well known. But it would surely have been echoed by Sigismund also, and it is perhaps not without special significance that our author should have seen fit to conclude his work with it.
Attempts to identify the audience for which the Gesta was intended can, of course, only be speculative. But we have been 1 Williams, p. 104. 2 Ibid. pp. 107-8.
led to examine the possibilities because the work, in our view, cannot be regarded merely as a " chronicle" in the accepted sense. It is rather, as stated above, a piece £'occasion, a piece of deliberate propaganda in which the narrative, valuable in itself, is used to reinforce this larger purpose. In such circumstances it must have been composed in terms of a particular audience or audiences. Indications throughout, and indeed the whole tone of the work, suggest that, in addition to its undoubted and immediate value for home consumption, our author may have had in mind events at the Council of Constance. At least it was there, and precisely at this time, not only that his countrymen needed all the support against the French they could obtain, but that justification was particularly required of both the policy of Henry V and the attitude taken up by his friends, notably his ally the Emperor Sigismund.
